We study risk-sharing equilibria with general convex costs on the agents' trading rates. For an infinite-horizon model with linear state dynamics and exogenous volatilities, the equilibrium returns mean-revert around their frictionless counterparts -the deviation has Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics for quadratic costs whereas it follows a doubly-reflected Brownian motion if costs are proportional. More general models with arbitrary state dynamics and endogenous volatilities lead to multidimensional systems of nonlinear, fully-coupled forward-backward SDEs. These fall outside the scope of known wellposedness results, but can be solved numerically using the simulation-based deep-learning approach of [28] . In a calibration to time series of returns, bidask spreads, and trading volume, transaction costs substantially affect equilibrium asset prices. In contrast, the effects of different cost specifications are rather similar, justifying the use of quadratic costs as a proxy for other less tractable specifications.
Introduction
The interplay between liquidity and asset prices has been studied extensively in the empirical literature, cf., e.g., [5] and the references therein for an overview. The analysis of theoretical models consistent with the main stylized facts established in these studies is challenging, however, since both models with limited liquidity and equilibrium asset pricing models are notoriously intractable on their own right. These difficulties are of course only compounded for models where equilibrium asset prices are determined endogenously in the presence of trading frictions.
Accordingly, tractable models often focus on settings where asset prices [47, 38, 49] or trading volume [46] are deterministic. Models where asset prices and trading volume both fluctuate randomly have recently been analyzed by focusing on quadratic costs on the agents' trading rates [22, 43, 9, 29] . The analysis of these models crucially exploits the linearity of the corresponding first-order conditions, thereby naturally raising the question how delicately the qualitative and quantitative predictions depend on the specific choice of the trading costs.
The present study addresses this challenge by studying risk-sharing equilibria with general convex costs levied on the agents' trading rates. This nests quadratic costs as one special case, but also covers proportional costs as another limiting case. We show that in an infinite-horizon model with linear state dynamics and exogenous price volatility, the corresponding equilibrium returns can be characterized explicitly up to the solution of a single nonlinear ODE. The latter determines the mean-reverting fluctuations of the frictional equilibrium returns around their frictionless counterparts. If costs are quadratic, this "liquidity premium" is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process similarly as in [22, 9, 29] ; for proportional costs it turns out to be a doubly-reflected Brownian motion.
To assess the quantitative differences between the respetive equilibrium returns, we calibrate our model to market data. This is challenging, since agents' preferences and endowments are not directly observable. However, we show that this difficulty can be overcome as follows. We first pin down some of the parameters by calibrating the frictionless model to a time series of prices. Then, we fit the additional parameters of our model with proportional transaction costs to bid-ask spreads and trading volume data, by exploiting that the average turnover rate in the model can be computed in closed form. To obtain comparable results for other forms of trading costs, we in turn match the corresponding trading volumes and stationary variances of the liquidity premium. Figure 1 : Simulated frictional equilibrium returns with calibrated parameters for quadratic trading costs (left upper panel), costs proportional to the 3/2-th power of the agents' trading rates (right upper panel), and proportional trading costs (lower panel). The corresponding frictionless equilibrium return is constant and equal to 7.64% here.
As shown in Figure 1 , realistic trading costs lead to substantial fluctuations around the constant frictionless expected returns if agents' trading targets are calibrated to match the large trading volume observed empirically. In contrast, the differences between the results for proportional, quadratic, and intermediate costs are rather small if the magnitude of these costs is matched appropriately.
Trading volume is a nonlinear function of the equilibrium returns in our model, and this transformation magnifies the differences between different cost specifications. Indeed, for quadratic costs, volume follows the absolute value of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, whereas subquadratic costs skew volume towards the "bang-bang-type trading" at either zero or infinite rates observed in the limiting case of proportional costs. As illustrated in Figure 2 , the simulated order flow corresponding to the calibrated model with costs proportional to a power 3/2 (in line with direct empirical estimates as in [37, 4] ) rather than 2 of the order flow therefore comes closer to matching the substantial skewness observed in real data.
Nevertheless, the broad properties of both models are quite similar. Accordingly, our results suggest that quadratic costs on the trading volume can indeed serve as a valuable proxy for other, less tractable, trading cost specifications. To analyze whether this remains true in more general settings, we extend our baseline model to more general state dynamics and endogenous volatilities determined by matching an exogenous terminal dividend. This leads to fully-coupled systems of nonlinear forward-backward stochastic differential equations. For quadratic trading costs, wellposedness of such systems has recently been established by [29] for agents with sufficiently similar risk aversions. If trading costs are not quadratic, wellposedness of the system is a challenging open problem, and simplifications to systems of coupled Riccati equations as in [29] are not possible even with linear state dynamics.
However, we demonstrate that, at least for sufficiently short time horizons, the system can be solved numerically by adapting the simulation-based deep learning approach of [28] . Here, the idea is to use a deep neural network to parametrize the "decoupling field" that describes the backward components as a function of the forward variables. For each choice of the decoupling field, the corresponding forward dynamics of the system can in turn be simulated by a standard Euler scheme, so that it remains to keep updating the initial guess for the decoupling field using stochastic gradient descent until the simulation matches the terminal condition of the equation sufficiently well. We verify that our algorithm produces accurate results by comparing it to the Riccati system that describes the equilibrium in the benchmark example with quadratic costs and linear state dynamics in [29] . With minor adjustments, the same algorithm is also able to deal with other trading cost specifications. This is illustrated in Figure 3 , where we plot the differences between frictional and frictionless equilibrium prices for quadratic costs and costs equal to the 3/2-th power of the agents' trading rates as in [1, 4] . Again, the precise choice of the trading cost only leads to small effects, even though the equilibrium volatility adjustment is deterministic for quadratic costs (as shown analytically in [29] and confirmed numerically in the left panel of Figure 4 ), but a mean-reverting stochastic process for 3/2-costs, see the right panel of Figure 4 .
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our frictionless baseline model and derives the corresponding equilibrium returns. In Section 3 this model and the equilibrium results are extended to general smooth convex costs on the agents' trading rates. The limiting case of proportional transaction costs is treated separately in Section 4. Both models are calibrated to time series data in Section 5. The equilibrium prices in more general models with arbitrary state dynamics and endogenous volatilities are linked to nonlinear FBSDEs in Section 6 and solved numerically in Section 7. For better readability, all proofs are collected in Section 8 as well as Appendices A and B.
Notation Throughout, we fix a filtered probability space (Ω, F , (F t ) t≥0 , P) supporting a standard Brownian motion (W t ) t≥0 . We write L p for the adapted processes (X t ) t≥0 that satisfy
2 Frictionless Baseline Model
Market
We consider two agents indexed by n = 1, 2 that receive (cumulative) random endowments
To hedge against the fluctuations of their endowments, the agents trade a safe and a risky asset. The price of the safe asset is exogenous and normalized to one. The price of the risky asset follows
Here, the constant volatility σ is given exogenously, whereas the expected returns process µ ∈ L 2 is to be determined endogenously by matching the agents' demand to the fixed supply s ∈ R of the risky asset. Related equilibrium models where the volatility is a free parameter are studied by [46, 51, 16, 33, 22, 50, 9] . Models where the volatility is determined endogenously are discussed in Section 6.
Frictionless Optimization and Equilibrium
As a reference point, we first consider the frictionless version of the model. Starting from fixed initial positions that clear the market, ϕ 1 0− + ϕ 2 0− = s, the agents choose their positions ϕ ∈ L 2 in the risky asset to maximize one-period expected returns penalized for the corresponding variances. Without transaction costs, the continuous-time version of this criterion is
Put differently, agents trade off expected returns against the tracking error relative to the exogenous target position −β n /σ as in [17, 43] . The optimal strategy for (2.1) is readily determined by pointwise optimization as
The equilibrium return is in turn pinned down by matching the agents' total demand ϕ 1 t + ϕ 2 t to the supply s of the risky asset at all times t ∈ [0, T ]:
The agents' optimal trading strategies corresponding to this frictionless equilibrium return arē
Note that the frictionless equilibrium return and the corresponding optimal trading strategies are independent of the time horizon T . In particular, the frictionless optimizers also maximize the long-run average performanceJ n T /T as T → ∞, in that lim sup
for all competing admissible strategies ψ.
With transaction costs -where the optimizers are no longer independent of the planning horizon -we will directly solve the long-run version of (2.1), see Definitions 3.2 and 4.1 below.
3 Equilibrium with Costs on the Trading Rate
Costs and Strategies
We now take into account transaction costs. A popular class of models originating from the optimal execution literature [2, 1] focuses on absolutely continuous trading strategies,
and penalizes the trading rateφ t = dϕ t /dt with an instantaneous trading cost G(φ t ). Portfolio choice problems for the most tractable specification G(x) = λx 2 /2, λ > 0 are analyzed in singleagent models by [22, 3, 42, 26] ; equilibrium returns are determined in [22, 43, 9] . In [27, 14, 8] , single-agent models are solved for the more general power costs G(x) = λ|x| q /q, q ∈ (1, 2] proposed by [1] . Below, we will determine equilibrium returns for general smooth convex cost functions G as studied in the duality theory of [25] :
The trading cost G : R → R + is convex, symmetric, and strictly increasing on [0, ∞), differentiable on [0, ∞), and satisfies G(0) = 0.
(ii) The derivative G also strictly increasing and differentiable on (0, ∞), and satisfies G (0) = 0;
(iii) There exist constants C > 0 and k ≥ 2 such that
One readily verifies that the power functions G(x) = λ|x| q /q, q ∈ (1, 2] proposed in [1] satisfy all of these requirements. So do linear combinations of these power functions, for example.
With transaction costs, the analogue of the frictionless mean-variance goal functional (2.1) is
Unlike its frictionless counterpart, this optimization problem is no longer "myopic", since the current position influences future choices in the presence of transaction costs, and since optimal strategies naturally depend on a finite time horizon T here. To simplify the analysis below, we therefore focus on the ergodic limit of (3.1), where the goal is to maximize the long-run average performance J n T (φ)/T as T → ∞. This criterion has a long history in single-agent problems with transaction costs, cf. [19, 45, 18, 23, 26] . Here, we show that it also allows to make the equilibrium analysis of general trading costs tractable. Throughout, we focus on admissible strategies
that satisfy the integrability conditions
as well as the transversality condition
Equilibrium
Definition 3.2. µ ∈ L 2 is a (long-run) equilibrium return if there exist admissible trading rateṡ ϕ 1 ,φ 2 for agents 1 and 2 such that:
(Market Clearing) The total demand ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 matches the supply s of the risky asset at all times;
(Individual Optimality) The trading rateφ n is optimal for the long-run version of agent n's control problem (3.1) in that,
The construction of the equilibrium return is based on the solution of a nonlinear ODE. For single-agent models with instantaneous trading costs of power form, a corresponding equation has been introduced and studied by [27] . 1 In Appendix A, we show that their existence and uniqueness proof can be extended to general cost functions satisfying Assumption 3.1.
q−1 q = δ 2q−2 λ as well as q = α + 1 in (3.5). Then, differentiating the first-order ODE (17) in [27, Theorem 6] leads to the second-order ODE (3.5). The same link to a first-order equation is exploited in our existence proof in Appendix A. 
Then the ordinary differential equation
has a unique solution g on R such that xg(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ R. Moreover, g satisfies
where G * is the Legendre transform of G.
Proof. See Appendix A.
With the function g from Lemma 3.3, we can now define the state variable that will drive both the expected returns and optimal trading rates in equilibrium.
Lemma 3.4. Let g be the solution of the ODE (3.5) from Lemma 3.3. There exists a unique strong solution of the SDE
Proof. This follows from results of [48] , see Section 8.1.
Remark 3.5. If the instantaneous trading cost is quadratic, G(x) = λx 2 /2, then (G ) −1 [x] = x/λ, and the solution of (3.5) from Lemma 3.3 is g(x) = − √ γλσx. Accordingly, the dynamics (3.7) simplify to
Whence, X is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in this case. In general, the drift rate in (3.7) describes the nonlinear attraction of the process X towards its average level zero, where xg(x) ≤ 0 ensures that the process is indeed mean reverting.
We now present our first main result. It identifies the equilibrium return for general smooth, convex cost functions. Theorem 3.6. With the solution (X t ) t≥0 of (3.7), define
Then, the trading ratesφ
clear the corresponding market and are individually optimal in the long run. Therefore, (µ t ) t≥0 is an equilibrium return.
Proof. See Section 8.1.
The first term in (3.8) is the frictionless equilibrium return from (2.2). Accordingly, the second term describes how the equilibrium return changes due to transaction costs. Evidently, if both agents have the same risk aversion, then the adjustment is zero like for the quadratic costs studied by [9] . In this case, both agents are adversely affected by the transaction costs, but the market still clears at the frictionless equilibrium price.
For heterogenous agents, there is a nontrivial liquidity premium depending on the current demand imbalance. Indeed, in equilibrium, the state dynamics dX t also describe the evolution of the deviation between agent 1's actual position and its frictionless counterpart,
By market clearing, the sign is reversed for agent 2. Accordingly, the liquidity premium is positive if the more risk averse agent wants to sell and negative if the more risk averse agent wants to buy to move closer to the corresponding frictionless allocation. In each case, the return adjustment ensures market clearing by offsetting the more risk averse agent's stronger motive to trade. For quadratic costs, we recover the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck returns from [9, Corollary 5.5]. For general convex trading costs, these are replaced by processes with nonlinear mean-reversion speeds.
Equilibrium with Proportional Costs
One important cost specification is not covered by Assumption 3.1: proportional transaction costs. These arise as the limit p → 1 in the model of [1] . Rather than studying the (singular) limiting behaviour of the corresponding optimal strategies as in [27] , we instead show that the equilibrium with proportional costs can be constructed directly using singular rather than regular stochastic control.
Since proportional costs only penalize trade size but not speed, risky positions are naturally described by general finite-variation processes in this case or, equivalently, by their Jordan-Hahn decompositions into minimal increasing processes -the cumulative numbers of shares purchased and sold:
As in [31, 41, 18, 40] we assume for simplicity that the (cumulative) costs λ(ϕ
, λ > 0, are proportional to the number of shares traded (rather than the monetary amount transacted). Agent n's goal functional in turn becomes
We again focus on the long-run average performance J n T (ϕ)/T as T → ∞ of admissible strategies that satisfy the integrability condition
Equilibrium
We use an analogous notion of Radner equilibrium as in Definition 3.2:
is a (long-run) equilibrium return if there exist admissible strategies ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 for agents 1 and 2 such that:
(Individual Optimality) The strategy ϕ n is optimal for the long-run version of agent n's control problem (4.1) in that,
The construction of the equilibrium return with proportional costs is based on the analogue of the mean-reverting process from Lemma 3.4. This turns out to be a doubly-reflected Brownian motion,
where
γ 1 +γ 2 and L, U are the minimal increasing processes with L 0− = U 0− = 0 that keep (X t ) t≥0 in the interval [−l, l], 2 whose endpoints have the following explicit expression:
where γ and δ are defined as in Lemma 3.3.
With the state variable X at hand, we can now formulate our second main result. It shows that the equilibrium return with proportional costs can be expressed in direct analogy to its counterpart for the smooth, superlinear costs treated in Theorem 3.6. The only difference is that the mean-reverting state variable in Theorem 3.6 is replaced by the doubly-reflected Brownian motion from (4.5).
Theorem 4.2. With the solution (X t ) t≥0 of (4.5), define
Then, the trading strategies
clear the market and are individually optimal in the long run. Therefore (µ t ) t≥0 is an equilibrium return.
Proof. See Section 8.2.
Note that, in equilibrium, each agent's singular control problem has a fully explicit solution. Similar closed-form expressions for optimal no-trade regions also obtain for the ergodic control of Brownian motion, which underlies the tractability of problems with small transaction costs [44, 32, 11] . Surprisingly, the equilibrium constructed in Theorem 4.2 displays the same tractability, even though the corresponding equilibrium return is not zero but a reflected Brownian motion.
Calibration
To assess the quantitative properties of our equilibrium returns, we now calibrate the model to price and trading volume data for a typical US stock, American Express (AXP). We use ten years of data from January 2, 2009 to January 2, 2019 available on the Nasdaq website. 3 
Calibration of the Frictionless Baseline Model
We first consider the frictionless baseline version of the model from Section 2.2. The exogenous (absolute) volatility σ can be estimated directly from the time series of stock prices, leading to σ = 15.003 for our AXP dataset. 4 To obtain a simple parsimonious model for the equilibrium returns, we suppose throughout as in [38] that there is no aggregate endowment (β 1 t = −β 2 t = σδW t ). Then, the frictionless equilibrium expected return from (2.2) isμ =γsσ 2 . As the number of shares outstanding is s = 854262000 5 , we chooseγ = 3.971 × 10 −11 to match this to the average (absolute) yearly returns of 7.635 in the AXP time series.
Calibration with Transaction Costs
Whereas the frictionless equilibrium price only depends on the aggregate risk aversionγ =
and aggregate endowment β 1 + β 2 , the individual values of these parameters need to be pinned down to determine equilibria with transaction costs. Moreover, the initial allocations fo the agents need to be specified and an appropriate estimate for the respective trading cost is evidently needed.
Proportional Costs For proportional costs, we use the AXP bid-ask spread quoted on BATS on Dec. 21, 2018 as a proxy: λ 1 = 1.05. 6 Once the aggregate risk aversionγ is fixed, the individual agents' absolute risk aversions γ 1 , γ 2 are free parameters in the present model, which correspond to the agents' sizes relative to each other. If both agents are of the same size, the frictional equilibrium coincides with its frictionless counterpart. To illustrate the effect of heterogeneity, we set γ 1 = 2γ 2 , so that the larger agent 2 has twice the risk capacity of agent 1. Then, withγ = 3.971 × 10 −11 we have γ 1 = 1.191 × 10 −10 , γ 2 = 5.956 × 10 −11 , and γ = (γ 1 + γ 2 )/2 = 8.934 × 10 −11 . For the initial allocations, we suppose that ϕ 1 0− = ϕ 2 0− = s/2. Finally, we calibrate the value of the endowment volatilities β 1 1 = −β 2 1 = δ 1 σ to time-series data for trading volume. More specifically, we choose the parameter δ 1 to match the average yearly share turnover in 2009-2018, ShTu = 1794406220 (that is, about 210% of the outstanding shares), 7 to the corresponding long-term average value in our model. Using the ergodic theorem, the latter can be calculated as in [23 
Accordingly, we have
3 See https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/axp. 4 For the stock prices around 100 in our time series, this corresponds to a Black-Scholes volatility of around 15%. 5 See https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/axp/stock-report 6 Since the corresponding stock price was approximately 100, this corresponds to a relative bid-ask spread of around 1%, in line with the parameter values used in [39, 10] , for example. 7 See https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/axp/historical?tf=10y
Superlinear Costs For comparison, we also consider the power costs G q (x) = λ q |x| q /q, q ∈ (1, 2]. In this case, the ergodic theorem shows that the long-term average share turnover per year is
Here, ν q (x) is the invariant density of the stationary law of the state variable X. For quadratic costs G 2 (x) = λ 2 x 2 /2, this is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (cf. Remark 3.5) whose stationary distribution is Gaussian with mean zero and variance δ 2 2 /2 γσ 2 /λ 2 . As (G 2 ) −1 [g(x)] = − γσ 2 /λ 2 x, the average turnover per year in turn is proportional to δ 2 in this case,
Accordingly, we have δ 2 = ShTu/(
) 1/4 , and it remains to choose an appropriate value for the trading cost parameter λ 2 . To make its impact comparable to the proportional cost, we choose it to obtain the same stationary variance of the state variable X as with proportional costs. With proportional costs, this process has a uniform stationary law with standard deviation l/ √ 3. With quadratic costs, the stationary standard deviation of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck state variable is
To match this with the stationary standard deviation for proportional costs, we choose λ 2 = 3.725 × 10 −10 . This leads to δ 2 = 1.173 × 10 9 , and hence β 1 2 = β 2 2 = δ 2 σ = 1.760 × 10 10 . Note that his value is substantially smaller than direct estimates for quadratic costs used in [21, 12] , for example. Whence, the value we use here should lead to conservative lower bound for the corresponding equilibrium effects of actual superlinear trading costs.
For general power costs G q (x) = λ q |x| q /q the solution g q of the ODE (3.5) is not known explicitly. However, by exploiting the homotheticity of the power function, a change of variable allows to reduce (3.5) to an equation that only depends on the elasticity q of the price impact function, but not the parameters λ q , δ q that we are trying to determine here. Accordingly, the values of λ q , δ q that match the average share turnover observed empirically as well as the variance of the state variable for proportional costs can be expressed as integrals of this universal function. For fixed q, these can in turn be computed by using a quadrature formula to integrate the numerical solution of (3.5), cf. Appendix B for more details.
For q = 1.5 (which is in line with empirical estimates of actual trading costs in [4, 37] ), this leads to
and in turn β Simulations of the equilibrium returns (generated with the same Brownian sample path) for these three sets of parameters are shown in Figure 1 . The corresponding model turnover for q = 2 and q = 3/2 is compared to the historical trading volume data in Figure 2 . Clearly, both simulations broadly agree with the level and mean-reverting dynamics observed in the data. However, the small differences between the corresponding state variables depicted in Figure 1 are magnified by the application of the function |( Figure 2 . Indeed, periods with very high and low turnover are substantially more common with subquadratic costs, in line with the empirical data.
More General Settings and Nonlinear FBSDEs
We now discuss how the results from the previous sections formally extend to more general settings with a finite time horizon, more general state dynamics, and endogenous volatilities. Corresponding verification results would require wellposedness for non-linear, fully-coupled systems of FBSDEs. For quadratic trading costs and sufficiently similar risk aversions of the two agents, such results are developed in [29] . Extensions to more general trading costs are an intriguing but challenging direction for further research. This is beyond our scope here; however, we discuss numerical algorithms based on the deep-learning approach of [28] in Section 7 below.
General Market
In this section, we consider more general state dynamics where, for n = 1, 2, the cumulative endowment is of the form
and the price of the risky asset has dynamics
Now, not just the equilibrium return process µ ∈ L 1 but also the initial price S 0 ∈ R and the volatility process σ ∈ L 2 are to be determined in equilibrium by matching the agents demand to the supply s ∈ R of the risky asset. To pin down these additional quantities, we assume as in [29] that the terminal stock price is given by an exogenous F T -measurable random variable:
This can be interpreted as a fundamental value or as a terminal dividend.
Frictionless Optimization and Equilibrium
The frictionless results from Section 2 readily adapt this more general setting. Indeed, also for a general stochastic volatility process, pointwise maximization of the goal functional (2.1) still yields the agents' individually optimal strategies,
The equilibrium return is then still pinned down by matching the agents' total demand ϕ 1 t + ϕ 2 t to the supply s of the risky asset:
Now, however, we also need to determine the corresponding initial price of the risky asset and its volatility. To this end, insert (6.3) into (6.1) and recall the terminal condition (6.2). This leads the following scalar quadratic BSDE:
As is well known, the solution of this equation can be expressed in terms of the Laplace transform of the terminal condition, leading to explicit solutions in many concrete examples [29, Section 4.1].
Example 6.1. If
then the frictionless equilibrium priceS is a Bachelier model with constant expected returns and volatilities:S
Agents n = 1, 2's optimal trading strategies in this frictionless equilibrium arē
Frictional Optimization and Equilibrium
With transaction costs, both individual optimization and the corresponding equilibria become significantly more involved, leading to systems of fully-coupled nonlinear FBSDEs. Let us first consider the agents' individual optimization problems for a given initial asset price S 0 ∈ R, expected returns process (µ t ) t∈[0,T ] and volatility process (σ t ) t∈[0,T ] . By strict convexity of the goal functional (2.1), optimality is equivalent to the first-order condition that the Gateaux derivative lim ρ→0
) vanishes for any perturbation ψ, cf. [20] :
As in [7] , this can be rewritten using Fubini's theorem as
Since this has to hold for any perturbationψ t , the tower property of conditional expectation yields
for a martingale M = M 0 + · 0 Z t dW t that needs to be determined as part of the solution. Itô's formula applied to (G ) −1 in turn shows that agent n's optimal position ϕ n and the corresponding trading rateφ n solve the following nonlinear FBSDE:
Note that for the quadratic costs G(x) = λx 2 /2 considered in [29] , the generator of the backward component does not depend on its volatility and itself. If the volatility is constant, the backward equation then becomes linear and can in turn be solved by reducing it to some standard Riccati equations [7, 9] . For stochastic volatilities, these are replaced by a backward stochastic Riccati equation, compare [35, 6] . With nonlinear costs, no such simplifications are possible. In fact, the wellposedness of the system is unclear even for short time horizons since no Lipschitz condition is satisfied for costs of power form G(x) = λ|x| q /q, q ∈ (1, 2), for example.
Despite these difficulties, solving for the corresponding equilibrium return is -surprisingly -not more difficult than for quadratic costs. To see this, plug both agents' optimality conditions (6.8) into the market clearing conditionφ 1 +φ 2 = 0. This gives
Whence, Z 2 = −Z 1 . Moreover, in equilibrium we necessarily have ϕ 2 = s − ϕ 1 ,φ 2 = −φ 1 , so that 9) since the trading cost G(x) is symmetric. This is exactly the same formula as for quadratic costs in [29] . Plugging this expression back into agent 1's optimality condition (6.6) in turn yields a backward equation that is linear in the optimal position, like for quadratic costs:
where the terminal condition comes from Y T = G (0) = 0. All nonlinearities are absorbed into the corresponding forward component,
If the volatility process σ is not given exogenously, it needs to be determined from the terminal condition S. By plugging expression (6.9) for the equilibrium return into the price dynamics (6.1), we obtain the following BSDE, which is coupled to the forward-backward system (6.10-6.11):
This is again the same equation as for quadratic costs [29] . In particular, if both agents' risk aversions coincide (γ 1 = γ 2 ), it decouples from the forward-backward system (6.10-6.11) and leads to the same equilibrium price as without transaction costs. For heterogenous but sufficiently similar risk aversions γ 1 ≈ γ 2 and quadratic costs, it is shown in [29] that a solution of (6.10-6.12) exists and identifies an equilibrium with transaction costs. However, the proof crucially exploits that with quadratic costs, the forward-backward system (6.10-6.11) for a given volatility process (σ t ) t∈[0,T ] can be studied by means of the stochastic Riccati equation from [35] . Establishing such results for more general trading costs -where such tools are not available -is a challenging direction for further research.
Here, let us just briefly sketch how the nonlinear FBSDE (6.10-6.12) reduces to a nonlinear ODE in the context of Section 3, where the endowment volatilities β n t = β n W t , n = 1, 2 follow Brownian motions. As in Lemma 3.3, define
8 Here, these linear dynamics obtain if this equation is expressed in terms of G (φ 1 ) rather thanφ 1 . In contrast, we need to work with the dynamics ofφ n to derive the market clearing condition.
Since the volatility process is exogenous and constant there, we don't have to deal with the second backward component (6.12) and, moreover, can work with the state variable
With this notation, the forward-backward system (6.10-6.11) becomes autonomous,
With the standard ansatz that the backward component Y t should be a function g(t, X t ) of time and the forward component, Itô's formula and the dynamics of the forward component yield
Comparing the drift rate to the BSDE (6.10), we therefore obtain the following semilinear PDE:
For a long time horizon, the solution should become stationary (g t (t, x) ≈ 0). This leads to the nonlinear ODE from Lemma 3.3:
For finite time horizons, where the PDE (6.15) cannot be reduced to an ODE, it is natural to expect that the correct solution still should be identified by the same growth condition in the xvariable. However, with a finite time horizon, these bounds will be a strict near maturity. Therefore solving the corresponding equations numerically -which is not straightforward even in the ODE case -becomes difficult in this case.
As a remedy, in the next section we therefore propose a numerical algorithm in the spirit of [28] . It solves the FBSDE by simulation and therefore bypasses the need to identify the correct boundary conditions. The algorithm approximates the dependence of the backward component on the forward components by a deep neural network. Whence, it is also able to handle higherdimensional settings, e.g., with endogenous volatilities.
Numerics
We now present a numerical algorithm to solve the FBSDEs from Section 6. The algorithm is then tested for the calibrated parameters from Section 5.
Deep-Learning Algortihm
Overview Solving the forward-backward system is challenging because it is multidimensional and the forward and backward components are fully coupled. Nevertheless, it is amenable to the simulation-based approach of [28] , which approximates the solution by a deep neural network. In [28] the focus lies on BSDEs, but the approach can readily be extended to FBSDEs.
Let us briefly sketch the main idea; further details on the implementation are provided below. The first step is to pass to a time-discretized version of (6.10-6.12), e.g., using the Euler scheme. Solving this system amounts to finding at each time step t k the unknown "controls" Z t k , σ t k . If the terminal condition is a function S(W T ) of the underlying Brownian motion only as in Example 6.1, then it is well known that the solution and in turn Z t k , σ t k are functions of the forward variables,
). The algorithm of [28] approximates each of these functions with a function in the class {Fθ :θ ∈ Θ} of neural networks, where we write θ = (θ Y 0 , θ S 0 , θ σ 0 , . . . , θ σ n , θ Z 0 , . . . , θ Z n ) for the collection of all the corresponding parameters. The goal now is to choose these parameters in order to match the terminal conditions Y T = 0 and S T = S(W T ) of the system sufficiently well. To this end, one starts with an initial guess for the network functions and then simulates the system forward in time.
In this way, a simulated Brownian sample path is mapped to a corresponding terminal condition. This mapping can be viewed as a deep neural network, which is determined by the choice of the building block networks {Fθ :θ ∈ Θ} (i.e., two networks of type (7.5) for each time-step) and the FBSDE system, which describes how these building block networks are concatenated over time (see (7. 2) below). To iteratively update the network functions until the terminal conditions are matched sufficiently well, one may then leverage computational technology available for such networks, such as backpropagation and stochastic gradient descent-type algorithms, see e.g. [24, Chapters 6 and 8] . This can be implemented efficiently, e.g., in Python using Tensorflow.
Algorithm Let us now describe the approximation algorithm in more detail. Fix a discrete time grid 0 = t 0 < t 1 < . . . < t n = T . For any choice of parameter θ, consider the following discretetime forward system obtained by discretizing (6.10-6.12): starting from initial values
For any choice of the approximation parameter θ, this defines a discrete-time stochastic process, but of course the terminal conditions Y θ T = 0 and S θ T = S(W T ) will not even be approximately satisfied for an arbitrary choice of θ. However, ifθ is a minimizer of
where the number n of time steps is sufficiently large and the function class {Fθ :θ ∈ Θ} is sufficiently rich, then (ϕθ, Yθ, Sθ) should be a good approximation for the solution (ϕ 1 , Y, S) of (6.10-6.12) at the time-points t 0 , . . . , t n . The minimization problem (7.3) can be tackled using the "stochastic gradient descent algorithm". The main idea is the following: if the objective functional L was known explicitly and differentiable, then the classical gradient descent algorithm could be applied. That is, starting from an initial guess θ (0) , one iteratively updates
where L j = L and the learning rate η j > 0 is fixed (η j = η for all j) or decreasing to 0. Under suitable assumptions on L and {η j } j∈N the parameter θ (j) then converges to a (local) minimum of L as j → ∞. However, since L is not known explicitly, one applies the stochastic gradient descent algorithm, which is the same procedure as just described, but approximates the expectations in L by a sample average in each iteration j,
Here, N b ∈ N is called the "batch size" and Y θ T (W i ), S θ T (W i ) are calculated by plugging independent Brownian motions W 1 , . . . , W N b into the Euler scheme (7.1-7.2).
In order to use this to apply the updating rule (7.4), one needs to be able to calculate ∇L j (θ) efficiently and this is the point at which the choice of {Fθ :θ ∈ Θ} becomes crucial. As is apparent from (7.1-7.2), the dependence of the solution on the parameter θ is complex, since the state variables and parametric functions are iteratively added, multiplied and composed. For instance
This makes the computational solution of (7.3) by classical numerical techniques highly challenging. Whence, while in principle any sufficiently rich parametric family of functions could be chosen for {Fθ :θ ∈ Θ} in the scheme described above, it turns out to be particularly useful to choose a class of neural networks here. Then, Y θ T and S θ T can be viewed as the outputs of a deep neural network with random input (W t k ) k=0,...,n . Thanks to the compositional structure of neural networks one can then use the chain rule to calculate the gradient ∇L j (θ) in closed form. Furthermore, the resulting analytical expressions can be evaluated efficiently using the so-called backpropagation algorithm, see, e.g., [24] . By using subgradients, this also extends to e.g. the "ReLU activation function" used below. Finally, all of this can be implemented efficiently in the computational graph structure employed in libraries such as Tensorflow or Torch.
In summary, the learning algorithm iteratively updates the network parameters θ until a desired approximation accuracy is reached for someθ. Note that the accuracy of the approximation can be verified out of sample (e.g., in the numerical experiments in in Section 7.2) by simulating a large number N test of additional independent sample paths of W and evaluating the empirical loss L j (θ) (with N b = N test ) on this collection of test paths.
Implementation For the numerical experiments in Section 7.2, each Fθ is a neural network with two hidden layers. For the activation function we choose the popular Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU ) ρ, which applies x → max(x, 0) to each component of a vector. Denoting by N 1 , N 2 ∈ N the number of nodes in the hidden layer, we thus consider functions of the form
2 are called the weights and biases of the network and we denote by Θ the set of all parametersθ = (A 0 , b 0 , A 1 , b 1 , A 2 ). To find a close-to-optimal parameterθ in (7.3) we randomly initialize the network parameters and subsequently use the Adam algorithm [30] , which is a variant of stochastic gradient descent which adaptively adjusts the learning rates for all network parameters. Here, some initial hyperparameter optimization has led us to choose N 1 = N 2 = 15, set the initial learning rate to 0.0005 and use a batch size of 128. In order to accelerate the parameter training procedure, we apply batchnormalization [34] (see also [24, Section 8.7.1]) at different stages: before the input is fed into the network, before applying the activation function ρ and after the last linear transformation A 2 . All computations are performed in Python using Tensorflow.
Numerical results
The algorithm introduced in Section 7.1 is now applied to solve the forward-backward equations corresponding to Example 6.1 from Section 6. As a sanity check, we first consider the simplest version of the model, where the price volatility is exogenous. In this setting, we compare the numerical solution to the nonlinear ODE that describes the exact solution of the infinite-horizon version of the model. Subsequently, we consider the model with endogenous volatility. In order to test the performance of the learning algorithm in this case, we compare its results to the semi-explicit solution in term of Riccati equations obtained for quadratic costs in [29] . Exogenous volatility We first consider the finite-horizon version of the model from Section 3 with power costs G q (x) = λ q |x| q /q, where q = 1.5, ϕ 0 0 = ϕ 1 0 = s/2 and the model parameters are calibrated as in Section 5. The algorithm described in Section 7.1 for the general FBSDE (6.10-6.12) can be readily adapted by setting σ θ t k = σ for all k, only considering the first two equations in (7.2), and minimizing E[(Y θ T ) 2 ]. An alternative, slightly more efficient approach is to use instead the system (6.13), (6.14) and discretize it analogously to (7.2). The algorithm from Section 7.1 in turn yields a parameterθ such that (Xθ, Yθ) approximately solves (6.13-6.14). This allows us to generate approximate samples of (6.13-6.14) by simulating sample paths of W and evaluating (Xθ, Yθ). On the other hand we know that Y t k = g(t k , X t k ), where g solves (6.15). Thus we generate N test = 10 6 samples of W , evaluate (Xθ, Yθ) on each of them and obtain an approximationĝ(t k , x) of g(t k , x) by assigning to each point x which is attained by a sample of Xθ t k the associated sample of Yθ t k . This yields an approximation of the solution to (6.15) on a (random) grid specified by the state variable. According to (6.11), the corresponding optimal trading rate is in turn obtained by applying (G q ) −1 (ĝ(t k , ·)) to the state variable.
We now compare this to the long-run optimal trading rate from Theorem 3.6, where g is given by the solution of the nonlinear ODE from Lemma 3.3. Figure 5 shows the graph of both functions at t = T − t k = 0.2 and at t = T − t k = 0.01, i.e., the samples of (Xθ (Xθ t k )) ). We observe that the long-run optimum is already very close to the numerical-solution of the finite-horizon problem even for a time horizon of just less than a quarter of a year. On the one hand, this justifies the use of the long-run model as a tractable approximation of its finite-horizon counterpart. On the other hand, it demonstrates that the deep learning algorithm indeed converges to the correct solution in this simplest version of the model.
Endogenous volatility
We now turn to the model with endogenous volatility from Section 6. We consider G q (x) = λ q |x| q /q both for q = 2 (quadratic costs) and q = 1.5 (power costs). For λ q , γ 1 , γ 2 , and β 1 = −β 2 we use the same parameter values as for the model with exogenous volatility (cf. Section 5) and we also again set ϕ 0 0− = ϕ 1 0− = s/2. The additional parameters a and b are calibrated to the frictionless equilibrium from Section 6.2. To wit, a is estimated from the time series (resulting in the same value as for σ in Section 5.1) and b is chosen so thatS 0 = (b − sγa 2 )T matches the current stock price. We focus on a short time horizon T = 0.2 discretized into n = 100 time steps.
The deep-learning algorithm from Section 7.1 in turn yields an approximate solution of the forward-backward system (6.10-6.12). To assess the effect of different transaction costs we compare the equilibrium price and volatility to the respective quantity in the frictionless equilibrium, i.e. we examine (sample paths of) the price difference Sθ −S and the volatility difference σθ − a over time. For quadratic costs it has been shown in [29] that optimal trading rates and the equilibrium price can be described in terms of a system of coupled Riccati ODEs. This provides a benchmark in the case of quadratic costs. The left panels in Figures 1 and 3 show two sample paths of the price and volatility differences for quadratic costs calculated by both methods, i.e., by applying the neural network based algorithm described above and by solving the system of ODEs derived in [29] . Evidently, the neural network based method provides a very accurate approximation of the equilibrium quantities.
The analogous plots for power costs with q = 1.5 are shown in the right panels of Figures 3  and 4 (in order to compare these to the corresponding results for quadratic costs, we use the same Brownian paths in each case). Note that no benchmark is available in this case. At least for the short time horizons considered here, the equilibrium prices for the two cost specifications turn out to be very similar. This corroborates the findings from Section 5 and suggests that quadratic costs can also serve as useful proxies for other less tractable costs specifications in settings with endogenous volatilities. 
As (G ) −1 is odd, it follows that, for x such that |g(x)| ≥ K,
Notice that |g| is increasing on [0, ∞) and satisfies lim |x|→∞ |g(x)| = ∞. Whence, there exists M 0 > 0 such that for every r > 0 and |x| ≥ 2r/c|g(M 0 )| + M 0 ,
Thus, [48, Condition (6) ] is satisfied and the results follows. For later use also note that, by [48, Lemma 1], we have the following uniform moment bounds:
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Market clearing evidently holds by definition of the trading rates (3.9).
Observe that the corresponding positions ϕ 1 satisfy
Consider a competing admissible strategy ψ for agent 1. Identity (8.2) and the convexity of G yield
We now analyze the terms on the right-hand side. To ease notation, seṫ
The dynamics (3.7) of X, Itô's formula, and the ODE (3.5) for g imply
Integration by parts and the dynamics (8.4) in turn yield
Here, the local martingale part is a true martingale. Indeed, by Hölder's inequality, the integrability condition (3.2), the polynomial growth of g established in Lemma A.5, and (8.1),
Also taking into account that G (φ 1 t ) = G (H(g(X t ))) = g(X t ), we can therefore use (8.5) to replace the second and the third terms on the right-hand side of (8.3), obtaining
The Cauchy-Schwartz inequality yields
By the polynomial growth of g established in Lemma A.5 and (8.1), we have sup
Together with the transversality condition (3.3), it follows that
Therefore, the trading rateφ 1 is indeed long-run optimal for agent 1:
An analogous argument shows thatφ 2 is long-run optimal for agent 2. This completes the proof.
Proofs for Section 4
The following lemma provides the counterpart of the function g from Lemma 3.3 for proportional costs. It is given in closed form; its properties listed here are therefore easily verified by direct calculations:
Lemma 8.1. With the constant l from (4.6), define
This function has the following properties:
(i) g is an odd, decreasing function;
(iii) g is continuous on R and g (l) = g (−l) = 0; 
and hence
Therefore, we have
so that the transversality condition (4.3) is satisfied. Notice that
As a consequence,
so that ϕ 1 satisfies the first integrability condition in (4.2). Now, apply Itô's formula to (X T + l) 2 /4l, obtaining
Rearranging, taking expectations, and taking into account that 0 ≤ U 0 ≤ |X 0 | ≤ x leads to
After applying Itô's formula to (X T − l) 2 /4l, a symmetric calculation and 0
Combining (8.7) and (8.8) yields the second integrability condition in (4.2); therefore ϕ 1 is indeed admissible. Market clearing evidently holds by construction; in particular ϕ 2 is admissible as well. For later use also observe that, by definition,
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Consider a competing admissible strategy with Jordan-Hahn decomposition ψ = ϕ 1 0− + ψ ↑ − ψ ↓ . To ease notation, set
By properties (i) and (iv) of g from Lemma 8.1, we have 
Since L, U only grow on the sets {X t = −l} and {X t = l}, respectively, properties (i) and (iv) of g from Lemma 8.1 and (8.10-8.11) show that
Together with (8.9), it follows that
To simplify this expression, use Itô's formula, the dynamics (4.5) of the doubly-reflected Brownian motion X, the growth properties of L and U , and the ODE for g from Lemma 8.1(ii) to compute
Integration by parts in turn yields
Since g is bounded, the integrability condition (4.2) implies that the local martingale part in this decomposition is a true martingale, so that
Now, the long-run optimality of ϕ 1 for agent 1 follows from (8.12) and (8.13) by taking into account that property (iv) of g and the transversality condition (4.3) imply
An analogous argument shows that ϕ 2 is optimal for agent 2, thereby completing the proof.
A Proof of Lemma 3.3
In this appendix, we establish existence, uniqueness, and properties for the second order nonlinear ODE (3.5) from Lemma 3.3. To this end, we introduce the following first -order nonlinear ODE:
and extend the ideas of [27] to general functions F which satisfy Assumption A.1. That is, in Lemma A.4, we establish that for suitable functions F , and any choice of a > 0 and b ≥ 0, (A.1) has a unique positive solution on its maximal domain which contains [ b/a, ∞). Then, for the first-order ODE:
Lemma A.5 shows that there is a unique value of b that guarantees there is a solution on R such that xg(x) ≤ 0, and the solution is unique. Moreover, Lemma A.6 proves that this solution to (A.2) is also the unique solution of the second-order ODE:
Finally, with the help of Lemma A.7 pointing out the relationship between Assumption 3.1 and Assumption A.1, we establish the proof of Lemma 3.3 with F chosen to be proportional to the Legendre transform of the trading cost function G.
To carry out this program, we first introduce the assumptions on F that are needed to generalize the argument developed for power functions by [27] . Subsequently, in Remark A.2 and Lemma A.3, we derive a number of consequences, which are crucial tools for the subsequent analysis.
Assumption A.1. (i) F is convex, differentiable, even, and strictly increasing on [0, ∞) with
(ii) F is also differentiable and strictly increasing on [0, ∞) with F (0) = 0;
(iv) There exist constants C > 0 and x 0 > 0 such that F −1 (x 2 ) ≤ C|x| for every |x| > x 0 .
Remark A.2. Some immediate consequences of Assumption A.1 are as follows:
(i) F is increasing on the whole real line, since it is an odd function (as F is even) and F is strictly increasing on [0, ∞);
(ii) Assumption (iv) implies that there is someâ > 0 such that F (x) >âx 2 for large x > 0. This is why p ≥ 2 in Assumption A.1(iii) is without loss of generality. (ii) For every x ≥ 0 and every α ≥ 1:
(iii) For x, y ≥ 0:
Proof. (i): Convexity of F implies that, for x, y ≥ 0 and 0 < a < 1,
As F is increasing, F −1 is increasing as well. Applying F −1 on both sides of the above estimate in turn yields the concavity of F −1 .
(ii): Recall that F (0) = 0 and again use convexity of F to obtain, for every x ≥ 0 and α ≥ 1,
Analogously, the concavity of
Since F is increasing we have F (x + y) − F (x) ≥ 0 for every x, y > 0. As a consequence, F (x + y) − F (x) ≥ F (0 + y) − F (0) = F (y) as asserted. The same argument also yields the analogous estimate for F −1 .
(iv): Since F is convex and F and F are strictly increasing on [0, ∞), we have F (x) > 0 and F (x) > 0 for every x > 0,
Hence,
.
Together Assumption A.1(iv) it follows that, for x ≥ |x 0 |,
which yields the desired result. 
Notice that f (x, y) is locally Lipschitz, so that local existence and uniqueness hold for the initial-value problem (A.1). For everyx ∈ [ b/a, +∞), let y(x;x, h(x)) denote the unique solution to (A.1) with initial condition (x, h(x)) on its maximal interval of existence. By directly calculating the first-order derivative, we find that for everyx > b/a,
For the second-order derivative, we observe y (x;x, h(x)) = −2ax + F (y(x;x, h(x)))y (x;x, h(x)), which implies that y (x;x, h(x)) < 0 and y (x;x, h(x)) < 0, where x ∈ (x,x + ) for some > 0. In addition, for every x >x such that y(x;x, h(x)) ≥ 0 still holds, we have F (y(x;x, h(x))) ≥ 0 and thus also y (x;x, h(x)) < 0, and y (x;x, h(x)) < 0. This means that y will keep decreasing until it is finally below 0, from which we can further infer that for x >x, y(x;x, h(x)) ≤ h(x). On the other hand, for x ∈ [ b/a,x) in the maximal interval of existence, we can apply a symmetric argument where we let x <x go backwards. This shows y(x;x, h(x)) ≥ h(x) ≥ 0 and, since
Moreover, a comparison argument shows that for everȳ
is contained in the maximal interval of existence of y(x;x, h(x)). And for x 1 <x 2 , by the fact that the graph of the solutions cannot cross due to the local uniqueness, and the fact that y(x;x 1 , h(x 1 )) is decreasing atx 1 while y(x;x 2 , h(x 2 )) is increasing, the graph of y(x;x 1 , h(x 1 )) lies below the graph of y(x;x 2 , h(x 2 )). Next, we show that any solution y of (A.1) such that [ b/a, ∞) is contained in its maximum interval of existence, and y(x) ≥ 0 for every x ≥ b/a, automatically satisfies the growth condition (A.4). From the above argument concerning the relationship between h(x) and y(x;x, h(x)), an important observation is that for every x ∈ [ b/a, ∞), we need to have y(x) > h(x), otherwise the solution will not stay positive. We summarize the properties of y as follows: From property i) and Lemma A.3(iii,iv), it follows that = M . In particular, for any δ ∈ (0, M − 1) there exists N δ ∈ N such that for every n ≥ N δ we have
For large x, we claim that the function s(x) = (M − δ)F −1 (ax 2 ) is a subsolution of (A.1). By Lemma A.3(v), we know that for
Since M − δ > 1, there existsx such that for x ≥x, we have (
Thus, for every δ ∈ (0, M − 1) and somex, we have y(x) ≥ s(x) = (M − δ)F −1 (ax 2 ) for x ≥x. In particular, for every small δ,
and therefore lim inf
If M = ∞, we substitute M − δ with N ∈ N and then infer with the same argument that lim inf x→∞
= ∞. In other words, the limit L exists and
Next, we show L = 1. First, assume to the contrary 1 < L < ∞. Since lim x→∞
= L, and by Assumption A.1(iv), there exists a constant K > 0 such that y(x) ≤ Kx for large x > 0. Moreover, for every δ ∈ (0, L − 1) and large x, by Property A.3(ii),
On the other hand, (A.1) implies
so that y (x) grows at least quadratically, leading to a contradiction. Now assume that L = +∞. From (A.1) it follows that lim x→∞ y (x) F (y(x)) = 1.
Notice that for large x such that y(x) > Cx 0 , Assumption A.1(iv) yields
Thus, for small δ and sufficiently large x, we have
. This implies that, for large x >x,
In particular, y(x) has a vertical asymptote, contradicting Property ii). In summary, we therefore have L = 1. We now show the uniqueness of y(x). Suppose there exists another solution y 2 of (A.1) such that [ b/a, ∞) is contained in its maximal domain, and y 2 (x) ≥ 0 for every x ≥ b/a, and there existsx, δ > 0 such that y 2 (x) ≥ y(x) + δ. Then, on [x, ∞), the graph of y 2 always lies above y otherwise it will violate the local uniqueness of (A.1). Moreover, for x ≥x,
which means y 2 − y is increasing. As a result,
which implies that, for every x >x,
But then, since y 2 also satisfies (A.4), and for large x we have
leads to contradiction. A symmetric argument yields the same results for the case where there existsx and δ > 0 such that y 2 (x) ≤ y(x) − δ. This establishes uniqueness. We now establish existence of a solution with the asserted properties. To this end, define y * (x) := sup{y(x;x, h(x)) :x ∈ [ b/a, +∞)} for every x in the union of the maximal existence of interval of y(x;x, h(x)).
By Lemma A.3(v), for every x 1 ≥ 0, we can choose a large y 1 > F −1 (ax 2 1 + 2
) is a subsolution to (A.1): choose y 1 large enough such thatỹ
Moreover, again by the fact the subsolution and the supersolution cannot cross, the graph ofỹ does not intersect the graph of h on [ b/a, ∞). In particular, the unique local solution y(x; x 1 , y 1 ) to (A.1) with initial condition (x 1 , y 1 ) satisfies
A comparison argument shows that [ b/a, ∞) is contained in the maximal interval of existence of y(x; x 1 , y 1 ), hence is strictly larger than h(x) for every x ≥ b/a. Thus for everyx ≥ b/a, the graph of y(x; x 1 , y 1 ) lies above y(x;x, h(x)) and, in particular, y 1 = y(x 1 ; x 1 , y 1 ) > y(x 1 ;x, h(x)).
Taking the supremum overx yields that y * (x 1 ) ≤ y 1 < +∞. Moreover, for every x ≥ b/a and every > 0,
As a consequence, lim sup
On the other hand, notice that for arbitraryx > x > b/a, y(x;x, h(x)) is increasing inx, thus for every , δ > 0 there existsx > x + such that y(x;x, h(x)) + δ > y * (x). In this case, y(ξ;x, h(x)) is still increasing in the interval [x, x + ], and for every ξ ∈ [x, x + ],
Therefore,
As this holds for arbitrary small δ > 0, it follows that
and in turn lim inf
In summary, y * therefore is a solution to (A.1) and satisfies properties i), ii) and hence satisfies also the growth condition (A.4). Finally, for b 2 > b 1 ≥ 0, we show the relationship between y 1 and y 2 . Define as before h 1 (x) = F −1 (ax 2 − b 1 ) and h 2 (x) = F −1 (ax 2 − b 2 ). Observe that h 1 (x) > h 2 (x) forx > b 2 /a and because note that any solution of (A.1) with coefficient b 1 is a subsolution of (A.1) with coefficient b 2 .
Whence, a comparison argument shows that the unique local solution y 1 (x;x, h 1 (x)) of the first equation with initial condition (x, h 1 (x)) lies above the unique local solution y 2 (x;x, h 2 (x)) of the second equation with terminal condition (x, h 2 (x)). Another comparison argument guarantees that y 1 (x;x, h 1 (x)) and y 2 (x;x, h 2 (x)) cannot cross. Therefore, it follows that [ b 1 /a, ∞) is contained in both of the maximal interval of existence of y 1 and y 2 with y 1 (x) ≥ y 2 (x). Now, we show that y 1 > y 2 on [ b 1 /a, ∞). Suppose to the contrary that there exits x 0 ≥ b 1 /a such that y 1 (x 0 ) = y 2 (x 0 ). Then,
which means that there exists > 0 such that for x ∈ (x 0 , x 0 + ), y 2 (x) > y 1 (x). This contradicts that Lemma A.5. Let F be a function satisfying Assumption A.1. Then there exists a unique constant b F such that the ODE
has a solution g on R such that xg(x) ≤ 0. Moreover, g is unique, and it is odd and decreasing and satisfies the following growth conditions: 
Moreover, since F is even, for x ≤ 0,
That is, y l (x; b) also satisfies (A. 
It's easy to see that g is defined on R and satisfies the growth conditions (A.6). We now show that g is indeed a solution of (A.2). Using (A.8), we can see that g is continuous at x = 0. Therefore,
which implies that g is odd. Furthermore, as y r is increasing on [ b F /a, ∞), and for
hence y r is increasing on [0, ∞), and we infer that g is decreasing. Since F is even, we have
Therefore we can conclude that
Likewise,
Moreover, the continuity of g is guaranteed at x = 0 since
In summary, g therefore is indeed a solution of (A. as asserted. This completes the proof.
Next, we show that with b = b F , the solution to the first-order ODE (A.2) on R with xg(x) ≤ 0 is also the unique solution on R to the second-order ODE (A.3) with xg(x) ≤ 0. Lemma A.6. Let F be a function satisfying Assumption (A.1). Then the unique solution g on R to (A.2) such that xg(x) ≤ 0 is also the unique solution on R of the second-order ODE g (x) = 2ax − F (g(x))g (x) (A.3)
such that xg(x) ≤ 0.
Proof. In view of the first-order ODE (A.2) satisfied by g, its derivative is also differentiable. Differentiating the ODE for g in turn shows that g also satisfies the second-order ODE (A.3). Now supposeg is a solution of the second-order ODE (A.3) with xg(x) ≤ 0. As We introduce one more Lemma before the proof of Lemma 3.3
Lemma A.7. Suppose the general cost function G satisfies Assumption 3.1. Then G * , the Legendre transform of G, satisfies Assumption A.1, and so does cG * , where c > 0 is a constant.
Proof. Observe that the Legendre transformation of the cost function G(x) is G * (x) = x(G ) −1 (x) − G((G ) −1 (x)).
Since the instantaneous cost G is even, G and in turn (G ) −1 are odd, so that the function G * is even. Moreover, G(0) = G (0) = 0 imply G * (0) = 0. As both G and (G ) −1 are differentiable, (G * ) (x) = (G ) −1 (x) > 0.
In particular, (G * ) −1 exists on [0, ∞) and is differentiable. Moreover, by the convexity and twice differentiability of G,
It follows that G * is convex and (G * ) is strictly increasing, so that Assumptions A.1 (i,ii) are satisfied. By Assumption 3.1, |(G ) −1 (x)| ≤ C(1 + |x| k−1 ) for C > 0 and k ≥ 2. Whence, there exists constant K > 0 such that
Since G * is increasing, it follows that if |x| > 1 and in turn 1 + |x| k ≤ 2|x| k .
Whence, there exist constants x 1 > 0 and C 2 > 0 such that for |x| > x 1 ,
Therefore, Assumption A.1(iii) is also satisfied. Again by Assumption 3.1, there exists c > 0 such that for large x > 0, (G ) −1 (x) > c|x| k/2 . Hence, for large x > 0,
Thus, there exists C > 0 and x 0 > 0 such that, for every |x| > x 0 ,
Thus, Assumption A.1(iv) holds as well.
We now turn to the proof of Lemma 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let G * denote the Legendre transform of G, and define
where γ and δ are defined as in Lemma 3.3. By Lemma A.7, G * and in turn F satisfy Assumption A.1. For the above choices of a and F , Lemma A.4 and Lemma A.5 therefore yield the existence and uniqueness of the constant b F and the solution g on R to the first-order ODE (A.2) such that xg(x) ≤ 0 for every x ∈ R. In view of the first-order ODE (A.2) satisfied by g,
Lemma A.6 shows that g is also the unique solution to the ODE (3.5) from Lemma 3.3: 1 (g(x) ) − G((G ) −1 (g(x))) + γσ 2 x = −g (G ) −1 (g(x)) + γσ 2 x.
Here, we have used in the last step that
=g (x)(G ) −1 (g(x)) + g(x)((G ) −1 ) (g(x))g (x) − g(x)((G ) −1 ) (g(x))g (x)
=g (x)(G ) −1 (g(x)).
To complete the proof, notice that
which yields the analog of the growth conditions A.6:
(G * ) −1 ( 
B Calibration Details
In this section, we provide some additional details concerning the calibration of the model with costs of general power form at the end of Section 5.2. If G q (x) = λ q |x| q /q, q ∈ (1, 2], then the nonlinear ODE (3.5) from Lemma 3.3 can be simplified by rescaling. Indeed, the solution then can be written as We also let v q denote the variance for ν q .
The goal now is to choose the model parameters λ q and δ q to match the share turnover in the model to its empirical level and the stationary variance of the state variable to its counterpart for proportional costs. To this end, definẽ In summary, for a given value of q, the solutiong q of (B.2) therefore needs to be computed numerically on a fine grid once. Then, we can use numerical integration to approximatec q ,ṽ q and in turn compute δ q , λ q via (B.6-B.7).
